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time the false checks are delivered to the depositor or notice is
given him that they are ready for delivery,' rather than from the
time the forgery is discovered or the time when the depositor de-
mands payment.'2
The modem tendency of Louisiana courts is to maintain that
the object of a statute is sufficiently indicated by its title when
such title directs attention to the general subject so that all per-
sons in interest are placed upon notice to make inquiry into the
statute itself.48 In keeping with this tendency, the court in the in-
stant case properly held Act 163 of 1934"4 to be constitutional. The
court was also correct in holding that checks, on which both the
payee's indorsement and the drawer's signature were forged, are
within the intendment of Act 163 of 1934. Such statutes are logi-
cally applicable to those instruments which are void at their in-
ception regardless of whether the indorsement of the payee is
subsequently forged or not.5 The result is in complete accord
with sound commercial policy.
F. H. O'N.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DENIAL OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION OF
THE LAWS-EXCLUSION OF NEGROES FROM JURIEs-Defendant, a ne-
gro, based a motion to quash an indictment for murder on an al-
leged denial of the equal protection of the laws by a systematic
exclusion of negroes from the jury venire box because of their race
or color. The trial judge ordered a new petit jury panel; but he re-
fused to quash the indictment on the ground that the constitu-
tional rights of the defendant were not affected since the mere
presentment of an indictment is not evidence of guilt. On appeal,
41. Intimidation by a drunkard husband may incline the courts to be
lenient toward a wife for her delay in notification and to allow her to recover
against the drawee bank even though the period of limitations has run.
Samples v. Milton County Bank, 34 Ga. App. 248, 129 S.E. 170 (1925).
However, where the wife failed to give notice of forgeries for more than
60 days after her husband abandoned her and for more than three years
after the forgeries occurred, a Georgia court very properly held that such
laches rendered the defense of duress unavailable. Ponsell v. Citizens' &
Southern Bank, 35 Ga. App. 460, 133 S.E. 351 (1926).
42. California Vegetable Union v. Crocker Nat. Bank, 37 Cal. App. 743,
174 Pac. 920 (1918).
43. State v. Thrift Oil & Gas Co., 162 La. 165, 110 So. 188 (1926);
State v. Terrell, 181 La. 974, 160 So. 781 (1935).
44. Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1938) § 675.1.
45. See Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law, § 124, La. Act 64 of 1904,
§ 124 [Dart's Stats. (1932) § 9141.
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the Louisiana Supreme Court" asserted: (1) that the indictment
should have been quashed if negroes possessing the necessary
qualifications were sytematically excluded from grand jury serv-
ice, but (2) that the burden was on the accused to prove such ille-
gal discrimination and that on the evidence presented he had
failed to discharge it. After granting certiorari, the United States
Supreme Court re-examined the evidence2 and held that there
was an unlawful- exclusion of negroes from jury service, revers-
ing the decision of the Louisiana Court. Pierre v. State of Loui-
siana, 59 S.Ct. 536, 83 L.Ed. 540 (1939).
The doctrine is well settled that there is a denial of the equal
protection of the laws3 whenever a state, in the selection of either
grand or petit jurors, discriminates against negroes solely because
of their race or color.' That there shall be no exclusion of his race
as such,5 in the selection of jurors to pass upon his life, liberty or
property, is a right to which every negro is entitled. However, his
right is limited to a requirement that there be no discrimination
in the selection of jurors; he has no right to have the jury com-
posed in part of colored men.6 In other words, a colored or a
mixed jury is not essential to the equal protection of the laws.
These principles being fixed, the problem is in their practical ap-
plication; and courts have differed widely as to what facts, when
proved, will make a showing of unlawful discrimination. Many
have held that a long continued absence of the names of negroes
from the jury lists, where there is a large negro population, makes
out a prima facie case of discrimination,7 and the burden is then
on the prosecution to rebut this presumption. On the other hand,
a number of courts, including those of Louisiana, have required
more positive proof of discrimination." In cases of this type, the
1. State v. Pierre, 189 La. 764, 180 So. 630 (1938).
2. On the right of the United States Supreme Court to review facts see:
Creswill v. Grand Lodge K. of P., 225 U.S. 246, 32 S.Ct. 822, 56 L.Ed. 1074
(1912); Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380, 47 S.Ct. 655, 71 L.Ed. 1108 (1927); Norris
v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 55 S.Ct. 579, 79 L.Ed. 1074 (1935).
3. U.S. Const. Amend. XIV.
4. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 25 L.Ed. 664 (1880); Virginia
v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 25 L.Ed. 667 (1880); Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370, 26
L.Ed. 567 (1881); Martin v. Texas, 200 U.S. 316, 26 S.Ct. 338, 50 L.Ed. 497 (1906).
However, the systematic exclusion of negroes from jury service does not
constitute an invasion of the constitutional rights of a white person. State
v. Dierlamm, 189 La. 544, 180 So. 135 (1938).
5. Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 25 L.Ed. 667 (1880).
6. Idem.
7. Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370, 26 L.Ed. 567 (1881); Collins v. State, 60
S.W. 42 (Tex. Crim. App. 1900); State v. Frazier, 104 W.Va. 480, 140 S.E. 324
(1927).
8. State v. Joseph, 45 La. Ann. 903, 12 So. 934 (1893); State v. Murray, 47
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United States Supreme Court has often seen fit to re-examine the
evidence and on several occasions has reversed the state decisions
purely on the fact issue."
It is obvious that the determination of fact issues in cases of
this nature depends directly upon the laws relative to the selec-
tion of jurors in the particular state. Alabama, the state in which
the famous Scotsboro case arose,'0 places upon its jury officials the
positive duty to inquire into the qualifications of every male citi-
zen of voting age and to place the names of all qualified persons
on the jury list." Under such a. statute, if discrimination exists
proof of it is a fairly simple matter and may be made by simply
showing that the number of negroes on the venire is dispropor-
tionately small and that there are other qualified negroes in the
county. However, in Louisiana, broader powers are vested in the
jury commission 1' and the problem is much more difficult. The
commissioners are directed not merely to list the names of all
persons qualified to serve but also to select, from those quali-
fied, three hundred names for the general venire box. 8 It is their
duty to select competent persons who, in their opinion, are best
qualified. 14 Under this kind of statute, evidence of discrimination
against a particular prospective juror should be required to sup-
port a charge of exclusion because of race."
La. Ann. 1424, 17 So. 832 (1895); State v. Baptiste, 105 La. 661, 30 So. 147
(1901); State v. West, 116 La. 626, 40 So. 920 (1906); State v. Turner, 133 La.
555, 63 So. 169 (1913); Haynes v. State, 71 Fla. 585, 72 So. 180 (1916); Whitney
v. State, 59 S.W. 895 (Tex. Crim. App. 1900); State v. Cook, 81 W.Va. 686, 95
S.E. 792 (1918).
9. Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 55 S.Ct. 579, 79 L.Ed. 1074 (1935), and
cases cited therein.
10. Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 55 S.Ct. 579, 79 L.Ed. 1074 (1935).
11. Ala. Code Ann. (Michie, 1928) § 8603.
12. Art. 173, La. Code Crim. Proc. of 1928.
13. Art. 179, La. Code Crim. Proc. of 1928. The Commission must them-
selves make the selection and cannot delegate that duty to any other person.
State v. Newhouse, 29 La. Ann. 824 (1877); State v. Taylor, 43 La. Ann. 1131,
10 So. 203 (1891); State v. Clavery, 43 La. Ann. 1133, 10 So. 203 (1891). How-
ever, the venire will not be set aside merely because the commissioners placed
names of persons In the general venire box upon the suggestion of an out-
sider. State v. Sheppard, 115 La. 942, 40 So. 363 (1906).
14. State v. Guirlando, 152 La. 570, 93 So. 796 (1922). The law does not
prescribe from which sources the commissioners shall draw their knowledge
of the qualifications of jurors. State v. Foster, 32 La. Ann. 34 (1880); State v.
Mangrum, 35 La. Ann. 619 (1883); State v. Chase, 37 La. Ann. 165 (1885);
State v. Green, 43 La. Ann. 402, 9 So. 42 (1891).
15. Although no standard is set, the Louisiana Supreme Court has inti-
mated that there should be a fair proportion of negroes on the jury list. See
State v. Pierre, 189 La. 764, 774-775, 180 So. 630, 633 (1938).
The fact that no names of women were placed in the jury box will not
sustain a charge of discrimination in the absence of proof that any woman
had filed an application with the clerk for jury duty and that this fact had
1939]
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In the instant case, the United States Supreme Court found
discrimination upon evidence which seems less convincing than
that which was before it in the Scotsboro case under the Alabama
statute. In the latter case, the evidence showed a "long-continued,
unvarying, and wholesale exclusion of negroes from jury serv-
ice ... .""I Although a large number of negroes were qualified
for jury service, the preliminary drafts of the jury lists had the
distinguishing abbreviation "col." after the names of negroes and
none of these names ever appeared on the final draft; no negro
had ever served on a jury. In view of the Alabama jury law the
only reasonable conclusion was- that negroes were excluded be-
cause of their race and color. In the principal case no such con-
vincing facts appear. At least four negroes were on the general
jury lists and at least one negro was selected for petit jury service
at the very same time that the grand jury, which was sought to
be quashed, was selected. In view of the large number of quali-
fied whites, the Louisiana Supreme Court felt that four negroes
out of three hundred prospective jurors was a fair proportion and
that there had been no discrimination. The Louisiana Court
pointed out that since the commissioners were white men it was
to be expected that they would select other white men, not be-
cause of discrimination against negroes, but because they would
be better acquainted with the qualifications of the white men."
Under the Louisiana type of statute the burden of proving
discrimination is on the defendant,18 yet the United States Su-
preme Court emphasized the fact that the State offered no evi-
dence to rebut that offered by the defendant. 9 However, it should
not be assumed that the prosecution could obtain no evidence, for
it undoubtedly felt, as did the Louisiana Supreme Court, that the
defendant had failed to discharge his burden. The United States
Supreme Court simply disagreed with the Louisiana Supreme
Court as to what the evidence proved.
The instant case raises a doubt which makes a potential Su-
preme Court case of every negro conviction in Louisiana. Since
the State offered no evidence, the case affords no reliable criteria
been made known to the jury commission. State v. Davis, 154 La. 295, 97 So.
449 (1923).
16. Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 597, 55 S.Ct. 579, 79 L.Ed. 1074 (1935).
17. State v. Pierre, 189 La. 764, 775, 180 So. 630, 633 (1938).
18. State v. Baptiste, 105 La. 661, 30 So. 147 (1901); State v. Turner, 133
La. 555, 63 So. 169 (1913). See also Bush v. Kentucky, 107 U.S. 110, 1 S.Ct.
625, 27 L.Ed. 354 (1883); Martin v. Texas, 200 U.S. 316, 26 S.Ct. 338, 50 L.Ed.
497 (1906).
19. Pierre v. State, 59 S.Ct. 536, 537, 540, 83 L.Ed. 540 (1939).
[Vol. I
NOTES
upon which to base predictions as to the United States Supreme
Court's attitude in the future. Many questions remain unan-
swered: Must the same ratio between qualified whites and
qualified negroes be maintained throughout the process of jury
selection? If so, what becomes of the rule that a mixed jury is not
essential to the equal protection of the laws? Is the Louisiana jury
law, as generally administered, unconstitutional? Must the jury
commissioners search out the entire population for qualified negro
jurors? What will the Court do when confronted with positive evi-
dence that negroes were considered but that the white men se-
lected were, in the opinion of the Commission, better qualified?
It is obvious that, even though the laws are administered fairly,
in some instances only a few negroes will be selected for jury
service. Under such circumstances, how can the State rebut what-
ever evidence the defendant might introduce in his attempt to
show discrimination?
The only positive evidence in the record showed that there
are no more than seventy-five or one hundred qualified potential
negro jurors in the parish. 20 This testimony was impliedly dis-
counted by the United States Supreme Court when they relied
almost exclusively upon the report of the Bureau of the Census
for 1930.21 According to the census figures, 70 per cent of the ne-
groes above ten years of age were literate; but these figures do not
take into account the fact that in Louisiana women are not called
for jury service,22 nor do they show how many of the literate
negroes were under the age of twenty-one and hence not avail-
able. Does the use of the census figures in the instant case indi-
cate that in the future the proportion of negroes on the jury
venire must be based upon the percentage of negroes (including
those under voting age) among the total literate population?
It is probable that in the future the proc~s verbal 28 of the
drawing by the jury commissioners will be made more complete;
for, having great evidentiary value, it could be used by the State
to rebut charges of discrimination. It has been the practice to in-
clude in the proc~s verbal only a statement of the acts of the Com-
20. State v. Pierre, 189 La. 764, 773-774, 180 So. 630, 632-633 (1938).
21. Pierre v. State, 59 S.Ct. 536, 539, 83 L.Ed. 540 (1939).
22. La. Const. of 1921, Art. VII, § 41 provides: ". . . no woman shall be
drawn for jury service unless she shall have previously filed with the clerk
of the District Court a written declaration of her desire to be subject to such
service." As a matter of fact, women are never called. State v. Pierre, 189
La. 764, 774, 180 So. 630, 633 (1938).
23. Art. 188, La. Code Crim. Proc. of 1928.
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mission, but in order to avoid the pitfalls occasioned by the instant
decision it should contain a complete record of the proceedings
showing why each individual was selected or rejected. 2'
W.J.B.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-INTERGOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY FROM
TAXATION-STATE INCOME TAX ON SALARY OF EMPLOYEE OF FEDERAL
INSTRUMENTALITY-The relator paid under protest a state income
tax on his salary earned as an attorney for the Home Owners'
Loan Corporation which is an instrumentality of the federal gov-
ernment. He thereupon sued for refund of the tax on the familiar
ground that state taxation of the salary of a federal employee is
unconstitutional. The state court allowed the refund, but on cer-
tiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States it was held,
that the tax was constitutional. Graves v. New York ex rel.
O'Keefe, 59 S.Ct. 595, 83 L.Ed. 577 (1939).
The Court pointed out that since the United States is a gov-
ernment of delegated powers all its acts in the exercise of such
powers are governmental. Therefore, the inquiry as to whether
action is governmental or proprietary has no application to the
federal government. Moreover, taxation of the salaries paid to
officers or employees, whether of the state or nation, is merely
the normal incident of the organization within the same territory
of two governments and does not place an unconstitutional bur-
den on either.
The present decision, together with that rendered in Helver-
ing v. Gerhardt,' apparently completes the destruction of the re-
ciprocal immunity of state and federal officers and employees
from non-discriminatory income taxes on their salaries. 2 The flat
ruling that the burden placed upon the government by such a tax
is remote, speculative and uncertain8 obliterated any distinction
24. State v. Green, 43 La. Ann. 402, 9 So. 42 (1891); State v. Love, 106 La.
658, 31 So. 289 (1902); State v. Gremillion, 137 La. 291, 68 So. 615 (1915).
1. 304 U.S. 405, 58 S.Ct. 969, 82 L.Ed. 1427 (1938), noted in (1938) 1
LOUISIANA LAW REviw 224.
2. The very recent case of O'Malley v. Woodrough, 6 U.S. Law Week 1356
(1939), by holding that the salary of a federal judge was subject to the fed-
eral income tax, gave added impetus to the trend which favors making all
income subject to non-discriminatory taxation. In reaching its decision the
court expressly overruled Miles v. Graham, 268 U.S. 501, 45 S.Ct. 601, 69 L.Ed.
1067 (1925) and apparently destroyed the force of the famous decision of
Evans v. Gore, 253 U.S. 245, 40 S.Ct. 550, 64 L.Ed. 887 (1920).
3. Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405, 58 S.Ct. 969, 82 L.Ed. 1427 (1938),
noted in (1938) 1 LouisIANA LAw R vEmw 224.
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